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Fast, Cheap, and Creditor-Controlled: Is
Corporate Reorganization Failing?
MELISSA B. JACOBYt
INTRODUCTION
Academic support for American-style corporate
reorganization has been at an all-time high, or, at least,
calls for the repeal of Chapter 11 have been at an all-time
low. Critics of Chapter 11 now say, approvingly, that the
process has become faster, cheaper, more creditor-
controlled, and more integrated with market forces.1 World-
renowned economists have looked to modern Chapter 11 as
the foundation of proposals to improve sovereign debt
restructuring internationally. 2
Endorsement of the modern Chapter 11 is by no means
universal, however. In Courting Failure,3 Professor Lynn
LoPucki, a well-known academic with deep expertise in
bankruptcy, portrays the bankruptcy system in a state of
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1. See infra Part III.
2. See, e.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS, 130-32
(2002); Jeffrey Sachs, Do We Need An International Lender of Last Resort? (Apr.
1995), http://www.earthinstitute.columbia.edu/about/director/pubs/intllr.pdf. See
generally Kenneth Rogoff & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Bankruptcy Procedures for
Sovereigns: A History of Ideas, 1976-2001, 49 IMF STAFF PAPERS 470, 471 (2002).
3. LYNN M. LoPucKI, COURTING FAILURE: How COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS
CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS (2005).
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crisis. In this book, we learn that nearly half of the largest
firms emerging from Chapter 11 as publicly held companies
are filing another bankruptcy petition in just a few years.4
LoPucki attributes the high repeat filing rate to the judges
who compete for cases by appeasing "case placers," the
parties who guide a firm's decision regarding venue
selection. 5 A high repeat filing rate first afflicted two
"magnet" venues, the District of Delaware and the Southern
District of New York, 6 then spread nationwide as other
judges have tried to attract cases to their own courts. 7
Courting Failure's policy prescription is to eliminate inter-
venue competition by restricting firms' venue choice. Since
the release of Courting Failure, LoPucki has convinced a
prominent senator to introduce legislation accomplishing
exactly that.8
Courting Failure is rich with systematic empirical data,
anecdotes, law, theories, allegations, and controversies, as
would be expected from a researcher who has made critical
contributions to our understanding of corporate
reorganization for over two decades. Plenty of academics,
lawyers, and judges are examining myriad aspects of
Courting Failure, including whether LoPucki oversteps by
characterizing the bankruptcy system as "corrupted,"
whether a significant repeat filing rate is per se
undesirable, whether LoPucki uses the ideal parameters to
measure repeat filings and failure in bankruptcy, and how
all of this affects the international market for judicial
services.
4. See id. at 120 tbl.7. By "largest," he means firms with at least $100
million in assets in 1980 dollars. Id. at xi.
5. See id. at 17-18. "Case placers" are professionals, the managers of
bankrupt firms, and lenders that finance a firm's operations through
bankruptcy (known as debtor-in-possession or "DIP" lenders). See id. at 17.
6. See, e.g., id. at 121-22; Theodore Eisenberg & Lynn M. LoPucki, Shopping
for Judges: An Empirical Analysis of Venue Choice in Large Chapter 11
Reorganizations, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 967, 979 fig.2 (1998-1999). For the term
"magnet" district, see GORDON BERMANT ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., CHAPTER 11
VENUE CHOICE BY LARGE PUBLIC COMPANIES: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM 4
(1997).
7. See LOPUCKI, supra note 3, at 120 tbl.7, 123-35. See generally infra Part
II.
8. See The Fairness in Bankruptcy Litigation Act, S. 314, 109th Cong.
(2005).
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By contrast, I highlight other aspects of Courting
Failure's ambitious thesis that ultimately cannot be
sustained. First, Courting Failure cannot tell us enough
about the pathways through which competition contributes
to failed reorganizations for us to rely on the competition
thesis to fuel policy change. LoPucki's repeat filing data and
his examples of competitive practices do not match up
temporally or substantively, particularly with respect to the
striking increase in repeat filings among firms emerging in
1997 and thereafter.9
Second, Courting Failure implicitly relies on an account
of the drivers of court practices that does not square with
the growing body of theoretical and empirical
interdisciplinary research on the determinants of judicial
politics and behavior. 10 Others in the legal academy share
LoPucki's assumption of judicial competition for large
bankruptcy cases, although they have different views of its
merits. Even if some judges do compete for large
bankruptcy cases, the broader literature casts doubt that
competition or the lack thereof is the dominant shaper of
judicial practices in the way that LoPucki suggests. In
particular, he takes insufficient account of the rise of the
transactional model of Chapter 11 and how the increasing
recognition of this model might affect the evolution of
judges' practices. 1
Part I of this Review puts Courting Failure into a
broader context. Part II scrutinizes Courting Failure's
evidence that competition is the principal determinant of
the increased repeat filing rates. Part III considers the
disconnect between Courting Failure's story and the judicial
politics and behavior literature.
I. COURTING FAILURE IN CONTEXT: A BRIEF INTELLECTUAL
HISTORY
Big corporate Chapter 11 cases have a special place in
America's bankruptcy system even though they comprise a
9. See infra Part II.
10. See generally infra Part III.
11. See infra Part III.A.
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404 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54
tiny fraction of bankruptcy filings. 12 The current venue laws
in Title 28 of the United States Code give large corporate
groups a choice of where to file. 13 A debtor may file in its
domicile, residence, principal place of business, or principal
place of assets.14 The Delaware court has interpreted
"domicile" to include place of incorporation, which
substantially increases the possibility that Delaware will be
among the list of venue options. 15
The choices proliferate further under the affiliate venue
rule. A bankruptcy case may be commenced anywhere that
an affiliate has a case pending, regardless of whether that
entity independently would have had proper venue. 16 This
dramatically expands the lawful venue options for large
corporate groups.' 7
12. Of the 1.6 million petitions filed in the year ending March 31, 2005,
fewer than 8,000 were Chapter 11 cases. See News Release, Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts, Bankruptcy Filings Fell in March 2005 12-Month
Period (June 10, 2005), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/PressReleases/
news61005.html. Most Chapter 11 cases are very small. See, e.g., Elizabeth
Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Financial Characteristics of Businesses in
Bankruptcy, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 499, 500 (1999) (reporting that more than 90%
of current Chapter 11 cases would be classified as small business cases using
definition in then-pending bankruptcy legislation).
13. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408-1412 (2000). Venue rules used to be more
restrictive. See generally NAT'L BANKR. REV. COMM'N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT
TWENTY YEARS, FINAL REPORT 771-73 (1997) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT],
available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nbrc/report/17bjuris.pdf (describing
venue under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and the 1973 Bankruptcy Rule
change).
14. See 28 U.S.C. § 1408(1) (2000).
15. See In re Ocean Properties of Del., Inc., 95 B.R. 304 (Bankr. D. Del.
1988). See generally LOPUCKI, supra note 3, at 56-57. Empirical research in
corporate law reveals the prevalence of Delaware as the state of incorporation.
See Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms' Decisions Where to
Incorporate, 46 J.L. & ECON. 383, 383-85 (2003) (reporting on incorporation and
reincorporation decisions). Eisenberg and LoPucki have studied the state of
incorporation for large firms in bankruptcy. See Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra
note 6, at 985 ("Eighty-nine percent of the large, public companies that filed for
bankruptcy reorganization from 1980 to 1997 were incorporated or had a
subsidiary that was incorporated in Delaware.").
16. See 28 U.S.C. § 1408(2) (2000). "Affiliate" is defined broadly in the
Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(2) (2005).
17. The choice of venue is not unfettered. A party may challenge a venue
choice, see 28 U.S.C. § 1412 (2000), and a court may transfer the case "in the
interest of justice or for the convenience of the parties." Id.; see also FED. R.
BANKR. P. 1014(a) (providing procedure for the transfer of cases to different
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Since 1978, judges in the District of Delaware and the
Southern District of New York have presided over a
disproportionate share of large bankruptcy cases.18 LoPucki
and Professor William Whitford first reported, based on
systematic data analysis, that the Southern District of New
York became the magnet court in the 1980s. 19 Later,
venues). Judges hardly ever transfer the largest cases, however. See, e.g.,
LOPUCKI, supra note 3, at 38; Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 6, at 1000; Lynn
M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Venue Choice and Forum Shopping in the
Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 1991 WIS. L.
REV. 11, 24; Lynn M. LoPucki, Bankruptcy Bingo, FORBES, July 4, 2005, at 44
("Of the 160 largest cases filed since 1989, courts have surrendered only one
(Winn-Dixie), and that was at the request of the managers who filed it."). Key
creditors often support the debtor's venue choice, and those that oppose it may
be reluctant to spend the money to litigate the issue. See LoPucki & Whitford,
supra, at 25; COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 13, at 778. Apart from challenging
venue once a case is filed, creditors can preempt a debtor's venue choice by
filing an involuntary bankruptcy petition. See 11 U.S.C. § 303 (2000) (setting
forth requirements). This is relatively rare and can fail; a court might dismiss
the involuntary case and permit the debtor to file in its chosen venue, see, e.g.,
In re NRG Energy, Inc., 294 B.R. 71 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2003), or transfer the
case away from the venue chosen by the petitioning creditors. See Eisenberg &
LoPucki, supra note 6, at 1000 n.113; see also LOPUCKI, supra note 3, at 9
(reporting New York's 2001 big case filings).
18. Commentators do not dispute that the Southern District of New York
was the leading venue in the 1980s, followed by Delaware in the 1990s. See,
e.g., Harvey R. Miller, Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases and the Delaware
Myth, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1987, 1991 (2002) ("During the 1980s ... the Southern
District of New York . . . was the leading venue for large, publicly owned
corporations to commence reorganizations."); id. at 2016 ("During the 1990s,
Delaware became the corporate reorganization capital of the nation."); Robert
K. Rasmussen & Randall S. Thomas, Whither the Race? A Comment on the
Effects of the Delawarization of Corporate Reorganizations, 54 VAND. L. REV.
283, 283-84 (2001) (noting that the reorganization of a large public company
today "will more likely take place in the Delaware Bankruptcy Court than in
any other jurisdiction."). For a graph showing Delaware's increasing market
share of big public filings during the 1990s, see LOPucKI, supra note 3, at 50
fig.2.
19. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 17, at 27-29 ("When forum shopping
occurred, the destination of choice was usually New York City."). Based on
interviews with lawyers, LoPucki and Whitford explored reasons for New York's
popularity, including top lawyers' location, judicial experience with large cases,
predictability, willingness to grant extensions of the "exclusive" period to file a
plan of reorganization, and approval of attorneys' fees. See id. at 29-33.
Recognizing the "push" of unattractive home venues as well as the "pull" of
attractive ones, LoPucki and Whitford also noted that debtors avoided courts
unlikely to lengthen the exclusivity period. See id.; Lynn M. LoPucki, The
Trouble with Chapter 11, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 729, 754 (noting that debtors' venue
choices relate in part to exclusivity).
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LoPucki and Professor Theodore Eisenberg documented
how the District of Delaware became the magnet court in
the 1990s after having no big cases in the mid-to-late
1980s. 20
The concentration of the largest cases in the tiny
Delaware court fueled critics and criticisms. A venue
restriction was one of the few proposals supported by eight
out of nine members of the National Bankruptcy Review
Commission. According to the Commission Report, "when a
debtor with thousands of small local unsecured creditors is
able to file for bankruptcy at the other end of the country, it
is impossible for these parties to represent their interests in
the debtor's case. Such strategies can affect the outcome of
cases. ' 21 Judges opined in a Federal Judicial Center survey
that large cases were being filed in inappropriate venues
and the venue laws should be changed. 22 More recently,
twenty-six state attorneys general complained to Congress
that bankrupt firms choose magnet venues far away from
their corporate headquarters to avoid financial
responsibility. 23
Although LoPucki and Whitford recognized the
possibility that case placers forum shop in the pursuit of
self interest, 24 they were hopeful that case placers would
20. See Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 6; see also LOPUCKI, supra note 3,
at 75-76. See generally David A. Skeel, Jr., Lockups and Delaware Venue in
Corporate Law and Bankruptcy, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1243, 1274 (2000) ("Then
everything changed. In the absence of a more attractive venue option,
Continental Airlines filed for bankruptcy in 1990. The Delaware Bankruptcy
Court's successful handling of Continental put Delaware on the bankruptcy
map, and Delaware quickly displaced New York as the venue of choice for large
scale reorganization.").
21. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 13, at 777; see also id. at 779 ("The
National Bankruptcy Review Commission received numerous letters on the
problem of the disenfranchisement of creditors due to forum shopping.").
22. See BERMANT ET AL., supra note 6, at 18-25 (reporting judges' opinions
that cases were being filed in inappropriate venues and venue laws should be
changed).
23. See Letter from the Attorneys General of [26 states] to Senator John
Cornyn (Mar. 2, 2005) (on file with the Buffalo Law Review).
24. According to LoPucki and Whitford:
In a system that permits venue choice and forum shopping, competition
among courts will not confine itself to issues of court quality.
Maintenance of healthy competition will require an ongoing effort.
Forum shoppers will discover and encourage other court policies and
406 [Vol. 54
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forum shop for the highest quality judicial services.25 Other
corporate bankruptcy scholars were likewise receptive to
the possibility that a court's increased popularity signified
its superior abilities. 26 In Professor David Skeel's view,
Delaware deserved its growing business in the 1990s
because it processed cases with greater speed and efficiency
than Other Courts.27 Skeel and Professor Kenneth Ayotte
practices that favor management or their attorneys without
maximizing the value of the company. When such differences in
particular policies and practices among the various bankruptcy courts
reach such a level of visibility that they actually affect the flow of
cases, some response will be necessary. Unless that response is
forthcoming, the policies and practices of the competing courts in large
reorganization cases will continue to shift in favor of the interests of
management and their attorneys.
LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 17, at 49-50; see also Skeel, supra note 20, at
1277 ("The real question is whether the differences among districts are likely to
be desirable or malignant."); William C. Whitford, What's Right About Chapter
11, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1379, 1403-04 (1994).
25. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 17, at 33, 40-41, 50-51 (discussing
benefits of competition, and favoring retaining current venue system and
addressing adverse consequences by making specific substantive changes);
Lynn M. LoPucki & Sarah D. Kalin, The Failure of Public Company
Bankruptcies in Delaware and New York: Empirical Evidence of a "Race to the
Bottom," 54 VAND. L. REV. 231, 271 (2001) ("Some may use our study to argue
for venue amendments designed to end the competition. But competitions
among bankruptcy courts have beneficial effects as well. They include the
development of more effective procedures and techniques for reorganization and
liquidation, the ability of parties to route around ineffective courts and judges,
and better representation of the United States in the developing global
competition for cases.").
26. See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., What's So Bad About Delaware?, 54 VAND.
L. REV. 309, 310 (2001) ("The problem with all the hostility is that Delaware's
skeptics have never developed a particularly convincing rationale for their claim
that the shift to Delaware is pernicious."); Skeel, supra note 20, at 1276 (noting
that "speed and administrative efficiency, as well as sophistication" are
characteristics that distinguish Delaware's handling of bankruptcy cases); see
also Hugh M. Ray et al., An Out of Town Lawyer's Guide to Wilmington
Bankruptcies, in BANKRUPTCY IN DELAWARE-WHETHER TO FILE AND WHAT IF IT
HAPPENS, ABA Section of Business Law Spring Meeting 5-7 (Mar. 22-25, 2001)
(on file with the Buffalo Law Review) (touting Delaware's predictability, speed,
"better judges," a convenient geographical location, and receptiveness to
approval of "aggressive" first-day orders). See generally FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE BANKRUPTCY
SYSTEM, CONFERENCE ON LARGE CHAPTER 11 CASES, (2004) [hereinafter
CONFERENCE ON LARGE CHAPTER 11 CASES] (reporting on conference at which
participants discussed substantive factors affecting venue choice).
27. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy Judges and Bankruptcy Venue:
Some Thoughts on Delaware, 1 DEL. L. REV. 1, 20, 27-28 (1998); Skeel, supra
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also observed through their own empirical study that major
creditor interests often supported or even drove the choice
of the Delaware court.28 Professors Robert Rasmussen and
Randall Thomas did not offer an unqualified defense of the
Delaware venue or forum shopping at the time of the
bankruptcy filing, but posited that handling prepackaged
bankruptcy cases in a single court like Delaware could be
efficient. 29 For the most part, these scholars readily
assumed not only that case placers were forum shopping,
but that judges were competing for the cases.
Discussions of Delaware bankruptcy case venue evoke
the now standard debate over interstate competition for
corporate charters and the puzzle of Delaware's popularity
as a place of incorporation. 30 Briefly, many scholars believe
that states compete to attract corporate charters, but do not
agree on the extent to which market forces (e.g., capital,
labor, product, corporate control) constrain managers'
pursuit of self-interest. 31 Even staunch supporters of
note 20, at 1278 (discussing Delaware judges' reputation for sophistication,
speed and administrative efficiency).
28. See Kenneth M. Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., Why Do Distressed
Companies Choose Delaware? An Empirical Analysis of Venue Choice in
Bankruptcy 3 (U. Penn Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 03-29, 2004)
(evaluating sample of Chapter 11 filers and finding that Delaware choice was
largely creditor driven); id. at 5 ("Because prepacks are agreed to in advance by
all of the relevant parties, the parties are likely to choose the most efficient
district when they file their cases."); id. at 8 ("[I]t may be the case that the
prepackaged plan is shaped with a particular court in mind, or more likely, the
threat of filing a regular case in a particular court will affect the terms of the
prepack."); id. at 9 (interpreting data to suggest that venue choices may be more
creditor-driven than manager-driven.); Marcus Cole, "Delaware is Not a State"
Are We Witnessing Jurisdictional Competition in Bankruptcy?, 55 VAND. L. REV.
1845, 1868 (2002) ("[T]here is undisputable evidence of some creditor preference
for Delaware.").
29. See Robert K. Rasmussen & Randall S. Thomas, Timing Matters:
Promoting Forum Shopping By Insolvent Corporations, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1357,
1388 (2000).
30. See, e.g., LoPuCKI, supra note 3, at 240.
31. For example, some research examines whether states with laws
benefiting managers but adversely affecting shareholders by certain measures
do well in the competition for corporate charters. See Bebchuk & Cohen, supra
note 15; Guhan Subramanian, The Influence of Antitakeover Statutes on
Incorporation Choice: Evidence on the 'Race" Debate and Antitakeover
Overreaching, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1795 (2001-02). Similarly, researchers have
studied whether the comparative value of firms (measured by share value)
incorporated in the reigning jurisdiction-Delaware-are worth more than
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interstate competition recognize that some undesirable law
results, but believe competition is preferable to an increase
in national corporate law or other alternatives. 32 The
assumption that interstate competition produces corporate
law leaves many things unexplained, 33  leading some
scholars to declare interstate charter competition a "myth"
or to tell a story of corporate law development with a
greater focus on interest group politics. 34 Whether or not
states compete, some prominent scholars periodically
propose more nationalization of corporate law or other
restrictions to counter management self-interest in ways
that markets allegedly have failed to do. 35
The analogy between a state corporate charter
competition and a federal bankruptcy venue competition is
firms incorporated elsewhere. Compare Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law
Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525 (2001), with Guhan Subramanian,
The Disappearing Delaware Effect, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 32 (2004). For alleged
limitations of the reliance on share value in the methodology of many of these
studies, see LOPuCKl, supra note 3, at 238-39; Lynn A. Stout, Share Price as a
Poor Criterion for Good Corporate Law (UCLA L. & Econ. Research Paper
Series No. 05-7, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=660622.
32. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAw 221-22 (1991) ("[Clompetition does not eliminate
the possibility of opportunistic behavior by corporate managers."); ROBERTA
ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF CORPORATE LAW (1993).
33. See Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the
Competition for Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061 (2000) (reviewing
literature and arguing that Delaware's distinct court system and judicial
lawmaking process give Delaware advantage); see also Mark J. Roe, Delaware's
Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491 (2005) (discussing the role of state-federal
relations in shaping state corporate law).
34. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or
Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the Competition Over Corporate Charters, 112
YALE L.J. 553, 555 (2002); Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State
Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679, 748 (2002); see also
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of
Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 486 (1987). Even scholars who
adhere to the competition thesis acknowledge that Delaware has a special
interest in competing for charters. See ROMANO, supra note 32, at 39, 42 (noting
Delaware's "hostage-like" dependence on franchise taxes).
35. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder
Power, 118 HARv. L. REV. 833 (2005); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, A
New Approach to Takeover Law and Regulatory Competition, 87 VA. L. REV. 111
(2001); Subramanian, supra note 31, at 1869. For arguments against such
changes, see, e.g., ROMANO, supra note 32, at 9.
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a rough one at best.36 Nonetheless, in Courting Failure,
LoPucki pursues it vigorously. Whereas LoPucki once hoped
that a market for judicial services for corporate
reorganization could produce a race to the top, in Courting
Failure he concludes the market for judicial services
instead has produced a race to the bottom. As he and
Whitford feared earlier, LoPucki now believes that
bankruptcy courts compete for large cases by indulging case
placers' self-interest, with adverse effects. 37
LoPucki describes adverse effects in terms of post-
reorganization outcomes, particularly repeat Chapter 11
filings. Like forum shopping, repeat filings are another of
LoPucki's long-term scholarly interests.38 Yet, only recently
36. For explanations of why alleged competition for large bankruptcy filings
and alleged interstate corporate charter competition differ in material respects,
see, e.g., Barry E. Adler & Henry N. Butler, On the "Delawarization of
Bankruptcy" Debate, 52 EMORY L.J. 1309 (2003); Cole, supra note 28, at 1886;
Rasmussen & Thomas, supra note 29, at 1362. LoPucki recognizes that inter-
venue competition in bankruptcy has the potential to produce worse results
than the competition for initial corporate charters due to the timing of the
decision. See LoPucKI, supra note 3, at 241.
37. It is possible that heavy concessions to case placers indicate the absence,
not presence, of competition for cases. Although some commentators associate
Delaware's less than 100% share of the charters of publicly held corporations
with the existence of competition, see William J. Carney, The Production of
Corporate Law, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 715, 726 (1998), others persuasively contend
that no state other than Delaware is actively competing for these charters. See
Kahan & Kamar, supra note 34. The absence of more rigorous competition
allows state corporate law to favor managers more than it should, see id. at 686-
87, and to cater to the corporate bar. See generally William J. Carney, The
Political Economy of Competition for Corporate Charters, 26 J. LEG. STUD. 303,
327-28 (1997); Macey & Miller, supra note 34, at 473, 486 (referring to corporate
lawyers as "most influential advisors" on incorporation decision). If nothing
else, this suggests that a market for law may not work well if it is more of a
mini-mart than a superstore. For a response to the myth of competition
argument, see Roberta Romano, Is Regulatory Competition a Problem or
Irrelevant for Corporate Governance? 12 (Yale U. Int'l Ctr. for Fin. Working
Paper No. 05-02, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.comsol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id=693484.
38. Among large companies that went bankrupt in the 1980s, LoPucki and
Whitford found that twelve of thirty-eight (32%) repeat filed. See Lynn M.
LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Patterns in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of
Large, Publicly Held Companies, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 597, 608 (1993). LoPucki
and Whitford characterized this repeat filing rate as "strikingly high," and
stated that "[t]he rate of refiling suggests that some courts are not taking [the
obligation to review plans' feasibility] as seriously as they should." Id. at 608-
09.
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has he so explicitly connected forum shopping and repeat
filing by comparing the repeat filing rates of various
venues. LoPucki and Sara Kalin first found that the most
popular court in the 1990s-Delaware-had a much higher
repeat filing rate among firms emerging between 1980 and
1996 than did most other courts.39  To address the
challenges to and follow-up questions about these
findings,40 LoPucki and Joseph Doherty studied firms that
emerged as publicly held companies, and found Delaware's
post-reorganization failure rate to again be much greater
than most other courts.41
39. See LOPuCKI, supra note 3, at 100 tbl.4. Among firms emerging from
Chapter 11 between 1980 and 1996, LoPucki and Kalin found a 32% repeat
filing rate for Delaware (10 of 31), 28% for New York (10 of 36), and 10% for
Other Courts (12 of 121). See id. LoPucki and Kalin speculated that "a part of
Delaware's appeal was its willingness to confirm no-questions-asked
reorganizations." Although Delaware confirmed plans of a smaller percentage of
firms in Chapter 11 than did Other Courts, LoPucki and Kalin nonetheless
speculated that Delaware (and previously New York) competed by rubber-
stamping plans. See id. at 256 (showing percentage reorganized); id. at 271
(making competition argument); see, e.g., Peter Aronson, Study Faults Delaware
Court, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 18, 2000, at B1; Jef Feeley, Companies Are Not Getting
Proper Bankruptcy Help, Study Says, BLOOMBERG NEWS, July 31, 2000.
40. See, e.g., Rasmussen & Thomas, supra note 18 (arguing, among other
things, that Delaware prepacks may be efficient even with high repeat filing
rate); Skeel, supra note 26 (positing that firm characteristics may explain
repeat filing differential); see also Miller, supra note 18 (attributing repeat
filings to deals between private parties); Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 28, at 5
(suggesting courts do not have direct influence over post-bankruptcy firm
performance, and thus considering other factors to evaluate venue choice and
its consequences).
41. See Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Why are Delaware and New
York Bankruptcy Reorganizations Failing?, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1933 (2002).
Among large firms emerging as public companies between 1991 and 1996,
Delaware had a 42% repeat filing rate (11 of 26), as compared to New York's
19% (3 of 16), and Other Courts' 4% (2 of 56). See id. at 1939. Studying other
post-bankruptcy events, LoPucki and Doherty concluded that Delaware was the
"failure" leader by these measures as well. See id. at 1939; id. at 1945
("Delaware-reorganized firms were ... significantly more likely to go out of
business as result of their financial distress, and significantly less likely to
perform successfully under their plans of reorganization. They also had
significantly lower post-bankruptcy earnings."). LoPucki and Doherty concluded
that the inter-venue differential was attributable to Delaware, not
characteristics of the firms. See id. at 1947; id. at 1957 ("Taken together, these
data suggest that prefiling characteristics of the firms filing in Delaware cannot
explain Delaware's high failure rates."); id. at 1982-83. They rejected
suggestions that Delaware's speed of processing cases overcame the costs of
repeat filings. See id. at 1963-1967 (evaluating and rejecting argument of
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In addition to reviewing these previously reported data,
in chapter 4 of Courting Failure, LoPucki presents updated
findings that are particularly relevant to the concerns of
this Review: unlike the first part of the 1990s, 42 when
Delaware's repeat filing rate was ten times higher than
that of Other Courts, repeat filing rates in Delaware and
nationwide among firms emerging between 1997 and 2000
converged and reached new highs.43 For firms emerging in
this period, both Delaware and Other Courts had a repeat
filing rate of 46%. 44 A relatively small number of cases fit
the study's parameters, so one must interpret this finding
with caution. 45  Nonetheless, I leave the scrutiny of
LoPucki's methodology to others, and instead examine his
explanation for this abrupt jump.
LoPucki theorizes that court competition explains the
repeat filing trends. 46 He therefore proposes amending the
venue statute.4 7 A rendition of LoPucki's proposal, now
Delaware offset). Cf. Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 28, at 14 (using a larger sample
of cases with a lower asset cut-off, finding "the estimated Delaware speed effect
is a sizeable 190 days and significant at the 5% level.").
42. See LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 41, at 1959 ("The fact that Other
Court-reorganized firms refiled at one-tenth the rate for Delaware-reorganized
firms suggests that the bulk of those losses were avoidable.").
43. The difference in Other Courts' refiling rates for the two periods is
"significant at the .001 level." See LOPuCKI, supra note 3, at 120.
44. Eleven out of twenty-four of Delaware's cases refiled and six out of
thirteen of the Other Courts' cases refiled. In the Southern District of New
York, four of the six large firms that emerged between 1997 and 2000 refiled.
See id. at 120 tbl.7; id. at 122 ("Beginning abruptly with firms emerging in
1997, refiling rates in the rest of the country jumped to roughly the same level
as refiling rates in Delaware."). New York's repeat filing rate during this period
was 67%. See id. at 120 tbl.7.
45. See id. at 120 tbl.7.
46. Id. at 121-22.
47. See LOPUCKI, supra note 3, at 251-54; see also Lynn M. LoPucki, Court
Shopping Bankrupts U.S. System, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 20, 2005, http://sfgate.com/
cgi-binlarticle.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2005/02/20/ING31BD3CO1.DTL
(advocating assigning cases to particular courts rather than letting firms
choose). LoPucki does not endorse other venue changes, such as permitting
firms to commit to bankruptcy venue in initial corporate charters when
managers' interests arguably are more aligned with owners' interests, or
requiring that firms file in their place of incorporation. See Rasmussen &
Thomas, supra note 29, at 1364, 1399-1403; Rasmussen & Thomas, supra note
18, at 307; Skeel, supra note 27, at 37-38; Skeel, supra note 20, at 1276.
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pending in Congress, makes three big changes.48 First, it
eliminates place of incorporation as a stand-alone source of
venue by expressly defining domicile as the location of the
debtor's principal place of business. 49 Second, it sharply
restricts affiliate venue. 50 Third, in the event of improper
venue, it requires that bankruptcy courts dismiss or
transfer a case. 51 As a practical matter, this bill would
eliminate in many instances the venue options of the
District of Delaware and the Southern District of New York
unless businesses moved their headquarters there.
Is such a change justified? Although critics of the
current system would support this venue restriction on
other grounds, I explore in Part II how Courting Failure
stops short of demonstrating a link between repeat filings,
judicial competition, and disadvantageous court practices.
II. How Do COURT PRACTICES AFFECT REPEAT FILINGS?
In chapter 4 of Courting Failure, LoPucki tells us that
Delaware was by far the repeat filing leader among firms
emerging in the 1991-1996 period, but Other Courts quickly
caught up with respect to firms emerging from bankruptcy
between 1997 and 2000.52 In a short segment at the end of
chapter 4, LoPucki states:
The refiling pattern . . . is consistent with court competition as
the principal cause of high refiling rates. Delaware was an active
competitor for cases from 1991 through 1996. During those years
Delaware had high refiling rates. New York and other courts
barely participated in the competition from 1991 through 1996.
They had relatively low refiling rates during those years. The
competition for big cases became the center of the bankruptcy
world's attention in late 1996 and early 1997 with the coincidence
of four major events. . . . That attention resulted in increased
48. See Fairness in Bankruptcy Litigation Act, S. 314 109th Cong. (2005).
49. See id. § 2 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 1408 (2000)).
50. See id.
51. See id. § 3 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 1406 (2000)). Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1412
(2000) (permitting, but not requiring, venue transfer).
52. See LOPUCKI, supra note 3, at 120.
413
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
pressure on other courts to adopt Delaware's methods in order to
match Delaware's attractiveness. 53
The four events in late 1996 and early 1997 to which
LoPucki refers are the National Bankruptcy Review
Commission proposal to end forum shopping, 54 growing
awareness of Delaware's near monopoly on large case
filings, a Federal Judicial Center report on venue, 55 and the
District Court's revocation of the reference to the Delaware
bankruptcy court shortly after the release of the Federal
Judicial Center report.56
It is not difficult to believe that courts became much
more aware of Delaware's dominance in late 1996 and early
1997. But LoPucki's thesis depends on courts changing
what they were doing in time to substantially affect the
repeat filing rates among firms emerging as early as 1997.
Could courts have reacted so quickly to be responsible for a
repeat filing rate skyrocketing from 4% to 46% practically
overnight?57 In the following sub-parts, I scour the
subsequent chapters of Courting Failure for evidence of an
abrupt shift in other court practices that would be
consistent with this explanation.
A. "Complex Chapter 11" General Orders and Protocols
In chapter 5, "The Competition Goes National," LoPucki
documents the adoption of "complex Chapter 11" protocols
and local rules.58 He reports that bankruptcy lawyers
approached their local judges to request changes in court
53. Id. at 121-22 (emphasis added).
54. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 13.
55. See BERMANT ET AL., supra note 6.
56. See LOPuCKI, supra note 3, at 121-22.
57. Again, I leave to others the task of questioning the robustness of
LoPucki's statistical reporting and assume that the jump that he reports is
valid. For sake of context, however, it is important to recognize that the mid-to-
late 1990s were relatively lean in terms of the absolute number of large cases
fitting LoPucki's parameters. 1990: 30 cases; 1991: 39 cases; 1992: 32 cases;
1993: 26 cases; 1994: 11 cases; 1995: 20 cases; 1996: 15 cases; 1997: 17 cases;
1998: 31 cases; 1999: 44 cases; 2000: 79 cases; 2001: 97 cases; 2002: 81 cases;
2003: 57 cases. See LOPUCKI, supra note 3, at 90 fig.3.
58. See id. at 123-35.
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practices. 59 For example, in Houston, lawyers "wanted
quicker hearings, at more predictable times" and "wanted
the local judges to award professional fees at rates
comparable to those in Delaware and New York. '60 Overall,
the requested changes would ensure that judges were
immediately available at the beginning of a case and were
prepared to grant motions right away to enable a smooth
transition into bankruptcy. 61 According to LoPucki, this
process repeated itself in large cities throughout the
country, with some courts adopting complex Chapter 11
protocols by general order or local rules facilitating the
approval of first-day orders. 62
Even if courts adopted protocols they suspected to be
bad simply to attract more big cases-an assumption more
closely evaluated in Part III of this Review-the adoption of
these protocols would be no more than consistent with
LoPucki's theory. This is because the formal procedural
changes that LoPucki highlights take place in early 2000
and thereafter, and thus too late to affect the outcomes of
most firms that emerged from Chapter 11 in the 1997-2000
time period.63
LoPucki surely is correct that many judges were aware
of Delaware's dominance as early as 1997.64 Some of them
59. See id. at 124.
60. Id. at 125.
61. See infra note 122.
62. See LOPuCKI, supra note 3, at 126.
63. The Houston court's adoption of a complex Chapter 11 designation,
which LoPucki describes as the first explicit adoption of competing practices,
was put into place in January 2000, although of course they were developing
the practices well before then. See Bankruptcy Court General Order 2000-2
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2000); LoPucKI, supra note 3, at 125-26; see also
Houston, We Know We Have A Problem (But We're Working On It!), BCD NEWS
& COMMENT, Feb. 8, 2000, at 1. The Houston attorneys' report, which led to the
Southern District rules, was dated late December 1999. See Bankruptcy Court
General Order 2000-2 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2000).
64. In 1996, 221 bankruptcy judges completed a Federal Judicial Center
survey about forum shopping and venue transfer. See BERMANT ET AL., supra
note 6, at vii (reporting response rate). In 1998, LoPucki was featured in a
widely-circulated bankruptcy publication in a story on how Other Courts could
try to compete with Delaware. See Keeping the Megacase In Your Home District,
BCD NEWS & COMMENT, Dec. 15, 1998, at 1 ("LoPucki says, whatever your
preference, what you do now could decide the future of megacases in your
district"); id. ("if courts start paying New York rates for attorneys' fees, the
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may have hoped to attract cases away from Delaware. Yet,
they would be relatively powerless to take such action on
their own if they were in courts with multiple judges. Multi-
judge courts that randomly assign cases would have had to
get agreement among all the judges on changes in practices
and communicate them to case placers. It is hard to
imagine that courts could implement changes quickly and
completely enough to be responsible for such a steep rise in
repeat filing rates among firms emerging in 1997-2000. It
also seems unlikely that this could happen without any
evidence of such agreement and implementation that
LoPucki could find and cite in his book.
Thus, chapter 5 tells an interesting story about the
evolution of large corporate reorganization practices in
urban bankruptcy courts. But the chapter does not
adequately or obviously connect this evolution to the
puzzling repeat filing trends of the 1990s.
B. Courts'Actual Practices
Another way to evaluate whether court practices
contributed to higher repeat filing rates is to look at how
courts actually handled large Chapter 11 cases in the
relevant time periods. In chapter 6, "Corruption," LoPucki
describes practices that allegedly stem from court
competition. 65 LoPucki does not frame this chapter as
providing documentation of the contributors to repeat
filings. Yet, given LoPucki's thesis, it is fair for a reviewer
to use this chapter as potential evidence of the proposition
that competition, as manifested through court practices,
explains the repeat filing trends in the 1990s.
This is LoPucki's list of damaging changes to court
practices:
1. The courts lost control over professional fees.
2. Failed managers tightened their grips on their jobs and
companies.
3. Corporate debtors had more difficulty recovering money
taken by failed managers.
word will get out"); id. ("Says LoPucki: 'Unless you are willing to cede the large
cases to Delaware-or other attractive cities-lawyers and courts will have to
make themselves competitive"').
65. See LoPucKi, supra note 3, at 137-81.
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4. Failed managers began paying themselves huge retention
bonuses.
5. The courts began rubber stamping prepackaged plans.
6. So-called critical vendors began grabbing the shares of
other unsecured creditors.
7. Managers began selling their companies at inadequate
prices for personal benefit instead of reorganizing them.66
Courting Failure's discussion of these changes includes a
variety of anecdotes and allegations, but, as explored below,
almost never is helpful to explain the repeat filing trends
among firms emerging from bankruptcy in the 1990s in
general, and the jump in repeat filings in 1997 in
particular.
In his explanation of change #1, professional fees,
LoPucki contends that the "evidence that fee practices
affect the placement of cases is overwhelming. ' '67 He goes on
to describe various studies that involved interviews and
discussions with lawyers as well as announcements by
several judges that they would not scrutinize fees. 68 Yet, the
discussion includes no data or arguments relevant to
connecting fees to repeat filings. 69
66. Id. at 139.
67. See id. at 141. But see Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 28, at 17 (suggesting,
based on an analysis of a broader sample of Chapter 11 cases, that attorneys'
fees are "likely to be, at most, a small part of a much larger picture" of venue
drivers and Delaware's "success").
68. See LOPuCKI, supra note 3, at 141-43.
69. It is generally recognized that Congress attempted to encourage market
rates of payment to bankruptcy professionals, and to discourage heavy judicial
review and caps, through the Bankruptcy Code of 1978. See, e.g., George W.
Kuney, Hijacking Chapter 11, 21 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 19, 26, 40-45 (2004). The
United States Trustee is now the government representative charged with a
supervisory role regarding fee applications. See 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(3)(A) (2000).
Although courts surely have some role to play, particularly if the U.S. Trustee is
not fulfilling its duties, Courting Failure does not specify what courts should do
when other parties do not object; LoPucki acknowledges it is "hopeless" for a
court to review voluminous fee applications in detail and that court-imposed
caps on fees are "somewhat arbitrary." LOPUCKI, supra note 3, at 142; id. at 42.
To the extent it is determined that professionals are over-billing the bankruptcy
estate, a broader structural solution may be required. See, e.g., CONFERENCE ON
LARGE CHAPTER 11 CASES, supra note 26, at 30-32 (discussing other approaches
to fee review, such as budget committees).
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With respect to the retention of failed managers,
change #2, Courting Failure contains only a short
paragraph that asserts the existence of a weak statistical
relationship between shedding failed managers and
successfully reorganizing.70 In addition, according to
LoPucki and Whitford's research on 1980s cases, trustee
appointment was very rare even before the advent of
alleged Delaware-driven competition and when repeat filing
rates were much lower.7 1
Change #3, the discussion of recovering pre-bankruptcy
transfers to failed managers, focuses on Enron, a corporate
group that filed too late to have any relation to the repeat
filing trends in the 1990s.7 2 Readers are shown no trends in
pre-bankruptcy transfer recovery that might have relevance
during this period.
When discussing retention bonuses, change #4, LoPucki
notes briefly that companies probably would have fared
better with a new management team, but his discussion is
otherwise not focused on post-reorganization outcomes. 73
Incidentally, Congress agrees with LoPucki that retention
bonuses are problematic and just restricted the conditions
under which they can be approved.7 4 Post-reorganization
failure did not play an explicit role in that debate, however.
70. See LOPUCKI, supra note 3, at 145.
71. See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in
the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L.
REV. 669, 699 (1993). The threat of trustee appointment could encourage
managers to make concessions to creditors, however. See id. at 701. LoPucki
and Whitford also found a high rate of management turnover. Id.
72. See LoPUcKI, supra note 3, at 145-51. Enron filed in 2001.
73. See id. at 151-56. The utility of increases in executive compensation
more generally-well beyond the boundaries of bankruptcy-is discussed in
LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 9 (2004). As Professor Stephen
Bainbridge observes, courts outside of bankruptcy also are reluctant to intrude
on the executive compensation decision. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Executive
Compensation: Who Decides?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1615, 1658 (2005) (reviewing
BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra). LoPucki nonetheless hopes that bankruptcy courts
will be the "last line of defense." LoPUCKI, supra note 3, at 152.
74. See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005) [hereinafter BAPCPA] (codified in
scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.).
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LoPucki's change #5, the "rubberstamping of
prepackaged bankruptcies," has the potential to relate more
directly to repeat filings, but the link remains elusive.
LoPucki can demonstrate that Delaware became the
prevalent venue for prepacks in the 1990s, and that
Delaware prepacks that emerged between 1991 and 1996
were more likely to fail than non-Delaware prepacks. 75 Yet,
he has no evidence that Other Courts evaluated prepacks
more carefully than Delaware during this period, other
than trying to use the repeat filing rate differential itself. In
addition, besides generally recognizing that judges were
aware of Delaware's rising market share and suspecting an
interest in competing, LoPucki offers us nothing (other than
the repeat filing rate itself) to suggest that Other Courts
became less careful with respect to prepacks that emerged
from 1997 through 2000 in a way that would have led to
increased repeat filings. Indeed, even if they had, Other
Courts presided over virtually no prepacks that would have
emerged in this time period. 76 Although the migration of
prepacks to Delaware could itself bolster LoPucki's case
that Delaware was competing, this does not help explain
the jump in repeat filing rates overall in 1997.
LoPucki's example #6 of a damaging practice that
results from court competition for large cases is "Critical
vendor" orders. 77 According to Courting Failure, the
Delaware bankruptcy court started approving such orders
in the mid-1990s. 7 8 Although he refers to no authority and
presents no data, LoPucki states both that the "increasing
cash demands became a significant burden on the
reorganization process" and that "[b]y the late 1990s, the
75. See LOPUCKI, supra note 3, at 160; LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 41, at
1974.
76. Only one prepack (Grand Union) was filed in the Other Courts that
would have emerged during this period. See LoPucKi, supra note 3, at 161
tbl.10. New York had only one as well. Id.
77. See id. at 163. Right after filing for bankruptcy, large businesses often
seek a number of immediate orders (so-called first-day orders) from the court.
Some debtors request permission based on the "doctrine of necessity" to pay the
prepetition claims of vendors who threaten to cease doing business with them
otherwise, but a liberal granting of critical vendor orders is inconsistent with
the Bankruptcy Code. See generally In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866 (7th Cir.
2004).
78. See LoPUCKI, supra note 3, at 164-65.
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competing bankruptcy courts were all following Delaware
in approving long lists of 'critical' vendors. '79 The reader
might infer that an increase in critical vendor orders
corresponded to the repeat filing trends in the 1990s, but
the relationship is not articulated. In addition, although the
Delaware bankruptcy court may not have approved critical
vendor orders in large cases prior to the 1990s (perhaps in
part because it did not have the opportunity), surely parties
requested and received such orders in other jurisdictions.
Courting Failure's example #7 of a damaging practice is
the approval of significant sales of assets outside of a plan
of reorganization through what is known as a "363 sale. 80
LoPucki lists nearly seventy major Chapter 11 cases in
which the debtor sold the company in a 363 sale between
1980 and 2003.81 LoPucki finds that Delaware conducted all
eight of the quickest 363 sales between 1992 and 2000,82
and also presided over a seemingly troubling sale in the
Polaroid case in 2002.8 3 He observes that, starting in late
2000 and 2001, non-Delaware courts have been approving
quick 363 sales.8 4 Even if the rise in 363 sales in Other
Courts at the end of 2000 indicates competition, this rise
comes too late to explain the quick surge in repeat filings
among firms that emerged from Other Courts between 1997
and 2000. More significantly, LoPucki's repeat filing sample
79. See id. at 165. In a list of adverse effects of critical vendor orders,
LoPucki mentions that they threaten "the survival of debtor companies." Id.
80. The Bankruptcy Code permits debtors to sell property out of the
ordinary course of business with court approval. See 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2000). If
the debtor seeks to sell substantially all assets, it should be able to do so
through a 363 sale only if the court can find a sound business justification. See,
e.g., In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d 1063 (1983). Otherwise, the debtor is supposed
to sell the business through a plan on which the creditors vote. See LOPuCKI,
supra note 3, at 167-80. The details of court procedures for the bidding and sale
under § 363 can affect whether the assets are sold for a market price. See, e.g.,
Douglas G. Baird, The New Face of Chapter 11, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 69,
72 (2004) (noting that in modern Chapter 11, "the judge ensures that sale is
conducted in a way that brings the highest price."); Ayotte & Skeel, supra note
28, at 13 ("a quick sale may result in a fire-sale price and/or a misallocation of
the firm's assets to uses other than their most valuable. For cases like these,
allocating more time to finding buyers for the assets may be beneficial.").
81. See LOPUCKI, supra note 3, at 170-71, tbl.11.
82. See id. at 169.
83. See id. at 175.
84. See id. at 169.
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excludes cases involving major 363 sales if they did not get
a plan confirmed and result in the emergence of a publicly
held company.8 5 Rising sales generally could be a sign of
rising competition--or a sign of something else, as
discussed in Part 111-but the data on sales do little to
bolster LoPucki's theory on repeat filings.
C. Plan Feasibility?
Although LoPucki only rarely mentions this argument
in Courting Failure,8 6 he has suggested in other work that
competition drives the repeat filing rate through changes in
judges' diligence in evaluating the feasibility of plans of
reorganization.8 7  Other commentators did not find it
credible to blame courts for the repeat filings of major
corporations, in part because their plans had been
scrutinized by sophisticated financial professionals with
significantly more expertise than most bankruptcy judges.88
85. LoPucki's repeat filing data are limited to companies emerging as
operating public companies and exclude complete or partial liquidation cases.
See LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 41, at 1937, 1966. See generally Douglas G.
Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 STAN. L. REV. 673
(2003) [hereinafter Baird & Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight]; Rasmussen &
Thomas, supra note 18, at 294; Skeel, supra note 26, at 318; Ayotte & Skeel,
supra note 28, at 11 ("It is not necessarily true that a successful reorganization
is the most desirable outcome from an efficiency perspective.").
86. See LOPUCKI, supra note 3, at 106, 160 (prepack discussion).
87. See, e.g., LoPucki & Kalin, supra note 25. The Bankruptcy Code
technically sets up the feasibility requirement as an affirmative obligation of
the court. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11), amended by Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat.
113, 216 (2005); United States v. Energy Resources Co., 495 U.S. 545, 549
(1990) ('The Code, moreover, requires a bankruptcy court to assure itself that a
reorganization will succeed ...."). Cf. Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman,
Does Chapter 11 Reorganization Remain a Viable Option for Distressed
Businesses for the Twenty-First Century?, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 153 (2004).
88. See Miller & Waisman, supra note 87, at 138. Others suggest that the
retention of a third-party financial expert might be necessary. Bankruptcy
courts could use Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence to appoint an expert
to assist with feasibility analysis. See Karen M. Gebbia-Pinetti, First Report of
the Select Advisory Committee on Business Reorganization, 57 Bus. LAW. 163,
203-04, 208-09 (2001) (suggesting that it may be necessary to appoint experts
for issues such as feasibility). Bankruptcy courts have occasionally mentioned
the possibility of using court-appointed experts for other issues. See In re
Chateaugay Corp., 154 B.R. 29, 35 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993); Solow v. American
Airlines, Inc. (In re Midway Airlines, Inc.), 221 B.R. 411, 417 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1998). Federal courts rarely use this power. See Thomas E. Willging, Court-
Appointed Experts 3-4 (Fed. Judicial Ctr., Staff Paper, 1986).
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Putting this issue aside, there is no evidence of a link
between repeat filings and judicial scrutiny of feasibility
other than the repeat filing rate itself. LoPucki does not
collect and record for his database whether creditors
objected to confirmation of a plan on the basis of feasibility,
nor does he record how a court handles the confirmation
hearing.
Where does this leave us? Courting Failure includes
updated and important findings on repeat filings,
documents trends in Chapter 11 that at least some readers
will find troubling, and recommends a controversial and
high-profile change to the venue laws. Many reviewers have
focused on a single strand of the book. For example, they
might scrutinize the repeat filing data in chapter 4 and/or
disagree with LoPucki that repeat filings are inherently bad
outcomes. Or, they might quibble with LoPucki's
characterizations of the trends in practices presented in
chapter 6, arguing that prepacks and sales are
improvements to Chapter 11, rather than derogations.
These evaluations of the book make important
contributions, but only by looking at the three strands of
the book together, as has been done in this Review, can we
determine whether the central premise of Courting Failure
has been fulfilled. I conclude that the mechanism by which
judicial competition might manifest itself in terms of repeat
filings remains very much a mystery.
III. BEYOND COMPETITION: WHAT DRIVES JUDICIAL
PRACTICES?
From his analysis in Courting Failure, LoPucki
concludes that Congress should limit the ability of judges to
compete by restricting the venue options of corporate
bankruptcy filers. He hopes that the inability to compete for
large cases will improve the ways in which judges and
courts deal with big cases such that they are less likely to
result in a repeat filing. Part II dealt with the first problem
with this proposal and its justification, namely that we do
not have a good sense of what, if anything, judges do to
make cases generally more prone to post-confirmation
failure. This Part addresses the second problem, namely
that LoPucki's proposal rests on an unfounded assumption
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that competing (or not) for large cases is a major
determinant of judicial practices in bankruptcy. 89
We know little about patterns of judicial behavior in the
bankruptcy context. Although a variety of projects in the
bankruptcy field have focused on judicial decision-making
in particular doctrinal contexts, just a few have focused on
the perceptions, behaviors, and motivations of bankruptcy
judges. From a 1995 survey, lawyers Stacy Kleiner
Humphries and Robert Munden report that most judges
expressed preferences for small cases, not large ones.90
From a 1993 survey, then Bankruptcy Judge Stephen
Stripp reported on his colleagues' time-saving techniques
due to their vastly expanding workloads. 91 Based on an
American Bankruptcy Institute survey from the early
1990s, Professor Theodore Eisenberg reported that judges
perceived themselves to be much more efficient handlers of
professional fee applications than lawyers believed them to
89. Cf. Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman, Reconsidering Judicial
Independence, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 23 (Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman eds.,
2002) ("[I]f we are to be successful in designing judicial systems to achieve our
instrumental goals, it is necessary to take account of what motivates judges and
allow for--or attempt to control-these motivations.").
90. See Stacy Kleiner Humphries & Robert L.R. Munden, Painting a Self-
Portrait: A Look at the Composition and Style of the Bankruptcy Bench, 14
BANKR. DEV. J. 73, 91 (1998). In the survey, thirty-eight of the 208 judges
reported a preference for large cases over small cases, and, of those thirty-eight,
only seven reported strongly favoring large cases. See id. at 91. Humphries and
Munden also reported that "the consensus of those responding was the clearest
of all our questions: judges view their chief duty as handling the mass of small
cases, with 71.6% of judges favoring handling the mass of small cases over large
reorganizations." Id. This is not as contradictory to LoPucki's thesis as it might
appear, for LoPucki believes that only a small number of judges need to be
competing for cases to corrupt the bankruptcy system. Nonetheless, it does
diverge from other non-bankruptcy studies in which researchers have found
some judicial preference for more significant cases. See generally Ehud Kamar,
A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1941 n.128 (1998) (reviewing literature in analysis of
Delaware chancery court and its use of indeterminate standards).
91. See Hon. Stephen A. Stripp, An Analysis of the Role of the Bankruptcy
Judge and the Use of Judicial Time, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 1329 (1993). These
techniques included having case trustees preside over hearings on confirmation
of individuals' Chapter 13 repayment plans and by declining to review the
content of motions if no party in interest objected to it. See id. at 1334-35, 1347-
48, 1392. Stripp noted early in the article that the time between the filing of a
complaint and the trial had more than doubled in four years, and that he was
working a third more hours than he had four years earlier. See id. at 1333.
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be.92 More recently, from oral interviews with about two
dozen judges, Professor Marcus Cole noted that almost all
the judges associated big cases with prestige and
satisfaction, but some thought the benefits of big cases were
overrated and that commentators made too much of the
motivations of Delaware bankruptcy judges, who were just
doing their jobs. 93
Three out of four of these projects were completed prior
to the awareness of Delaware's rising market share in large
corporate reorganizations, and all four were completed prior
to the release of data in Courting Failure showing the sharp
increase in repeat filings nationwide, suggesting that
conversations with judges might proceed differently today.94
In any event, however, these studies do not tell us much
about the relationship between venue flexibility and court
practices.
Without a clear direction arising from the limited
studies of bankruptcy judges' motivations, it helps to
canvas the literature more broadly. Although of no special
concern to legal scholars, judicial behavior has been of
much interest to political scientists, economists, and
psychologists. 95 A large proportion of the research examines
92. See Theodore Eisenberg, Differing Perceptions of Attorneys' Fees in
Bankruptcy Cases, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 979, 983-84 (1994).
93. See Cole, supra note 28, at 1875-76.
94. For a critical discussion of whether reliable insights on judicial
motivations and attitudes can be derived from judges themselves, see Howard
Gillman, What's Law Got to Do With It? Judicial Behavioralists Test the "Legal
Model" of Judicial Decisionmaking, 26 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 465, 476 (2001)
(reporting on exchange between political scientists). See also Eisenberg, supra
note 92, at 995 ("For at least some studies, the findings will depend on who is
asked about the system.").
95. The field is newer and less developed than the study of legislative
behavior. See Lawrence Baum, What Judges Want: Judges' Goals and Judicial
Behavior, 47 POL. RES. Q. 749, 750 (1994). Scholars have employed a variety of
approaches over time, from behavioralism, to attitudinalism, to rational choice
and other types of new institutionalism. See, e.g., HAROLD J. SPAETH & JEFFREY
A. SEGAL, MAJORITY RULE OR MINORITY WILL: ADHERENCE TO PRECEDENT ON THE
U.S. SUPREME COURT (1999) (attitudinalist); Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Toward
a Strategic Revolution in Judicial Politics: A Look Back, A Look Ahead, 53 POL.
RES. Q. 625 (2000) (strategic/rational choice); Keith E. Whittington, Once More
Unto the Breach: Postbehavioralist Approaches to Judicial Politics, 25 LAw &
SOC. INQUIRY 601, 608-16 (2000) (evaluating historical/interpretive new
institutionalism and rational choice new institutionalism, and describing new
institutionalism as reaction to attitudinalist model). See generally Michael
[Vol. 54424
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voting patterns or undertakes case citation/precedent
analysis with respect to the United State Supreme Court. 96
This sheds indirect light at best on a non-life tenure trial
court that presides over bankruptcy cases. However, the
enterprise of studying judicial behavior has not been
entirely confined to the high court and occasionally has
been extended to the United States Courts of Appeals, 97
United States district judges,98 state supreme courts,99
other trial-level judges, 10 0 and courts with narrower subject
matter jurisdiction. 10 1 Some of the theoretical and empirical
Heise, The Past, Present and Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship: Judicial
Decision Making and the New Empiricism, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 819, 833-45
(describing and collecting studies on behavioralism, attitudinalism, a revised
legal model, public choice, and various types of institutionalism); Gillman,
supra note 94 (reviewing attitudinalist and behavioralist work from the
perspective of an institutionalist).
96. See generally DAVID E. KLEIN, MAKING LAW IN THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS 7 (2004) ("Political scientists interested in judicial decisionmaking
have overwhelmingly tended to concentrate on individual judges' votes on case
outcomes."); Frank Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals,
91 CAL. L. REV. 1457, 1479 (2003) (referring to research on political
decisionmaking and strategic decisionmaking); David S. Law, Strategic Judicial
Lawmaking: Ideology, Publication, and Asylum Law in the Ninth Circuit, 73 U.
CIN. L. REV. 817, 829 (2005) ("Judicial researchers have long been preoccupied
with the Supreme Court, to the neglect of other courts that are equally
deserving of study but lack the same cachet."); Frederick Schauer, Incentives,
Reputation, and the Inglorious Determinants of Judicial Behavior, 68 U. CIN. L.
REV. 615, 621 (2000) (making this observation from literature review).
97. See, e.g., KLEIN, supra note 96; Cross, supra note 96; Tracey E. George,
Developing a Positive Theory of Decisionmaking on U.S. Courts of Appeals, 58
OHIO ST. L.J. 1635 (1998); David Klein & Darby Morrisroe, The Prestige and
Influence of Individual Judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 28 J. LEGAL STUD.
371 (1999).
98. See, e.g., C. K. ROWLAND & ROBERT A. CARP, POLITICS AND JUDGMENT IN
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (1996); Andrew P. Morris, Michael Heise & Gregory
C. Sisk, Signaling and Precedent in Federal District Court Opinions, 13 SuP. CT.
ECON. REV. 63 (2005); see also WILLIAM I. KITCHIN, FEDERAL DISTRICT JUDGES: AN
ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL PERCEPTIONS (1978).
99. See, e.g., GLENDON SCHUBERT, QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL
BEHAVIOR (1959); Schauer, supra note 96, at 621 n.36 (collecting examples).
100. See, e.g., MILTON NEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING (1978) (studying
Connecticut courts).
101. See Lawrence Baum, Judicial Specialization, Litigant Influence, and
Substantive Policy: The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, 11 LAW & SOC'Y
REV. 823 (1977) [hereinafter Judicial Specialization]; Lawrence Baum,
Specialization and Authority Acceptance: The Supreme Court and Lower
Federal Courts, 47 POL. RES. Q. 693, 701 (1994); Lawrence Baum, Specializing
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studies may help us untangle the question of why judges
change their practices and how it might relate to Chapter
11 repeat filings.
For purposes of examining LoPucki's assumption about
the driver of judicial practices, perhaps the most important
insight from this body of work is that judges' actions are
likely to be shaped by more than one goal.10 2 Political
scientist Lawrence Baum offers the following partial
typology of goals:
1. Content of legal policy (including accurate interpretation of
existing law, clear and consistent interpretation, and the
judge's own policy preferences);
2. Personal standing with court audiences (including
popularity and respect in the legal community, in the
community as a whole, and power outside the court);
3. Career (including continued tenure in judicial position,
promotion to higher court, and securing an attractive
nonjudicial position);
4. Life on the court (including good relations with other
judges and non-judge participants in the courts, power
the Federal Courts: Neutral Reforms or Efforts to Shape Judicial Policy?, 74
JUDICATURE 217 (1991). In the legal academy, Professor Daniel Schneider has
done a series of studies on the impact of judges' social background on outcomes
in the tax context. See, e.g., Daniel M. Schneider, Assessing and Predicting Who
Wins Federal Tax Trial Decisions, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 473 (2002).
102. See, e.g., LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 16-17,
134 (1997) (noting that rational choice scholars recognize wide range of other
motivations for judicial behavior and activity even as they assume that judges
seek to pursue policy goals); KLEIN, supra note 96, at 10-11 (assuming that all
circuit judges wish to accomplish at least one or more of four goals); Stephen M.
Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize? (The Same Way
Everybody Else Does-Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud
Opinions, 51 EMORY L.J. 83, 106 (2002); Gregory A. Caldeira, Book Review, 88
AM. POL. SCi. REV. 485, 485 (1994) (reviewing JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J.
SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993)) (noting that
the attitudinal model is extreme-at least initially-and that Segal and Spaeth
fail to set up a "realistic competitor"); see also Russell Smyth, Do Judges Behave
as Homo Economicus, and, If So, Can We Measure Their Performance? An
Antipodean Perspective on a Tournament of Judges, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1299,
1302-07 (reviewing literature and identifying at least four areas that may be
relevant to judicial behavior beyond interpreting and applying the law,
including financial considerations, promotion, respect of colleagues, and
influence); Karen Swenson, Federal District Court Judges and the Decision to
Publish, 25 JUST. SYS. J. 121, 123 (2004) ("Like Lawrence Baum and other
scholars, I believe that these emphases on single goals are incomplete, and that
judges are motivated by a wider array of goals. Judges wish to make good law,
to advance policy, and more.").
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within the court, limited workloads, and court resources);
and
5. Standard of living (including personal income and personal
comfort). 103
Again, Baum and 'other political scientists study why
courts handle their work in the way that they do, and thus
their research is relevant to LoPucki's central claim that
court competition drove the changes to court practices, and
that in the event of a venue restriction, court practices
would evolve again to promote more successful Chapter 11
cases.
With these ideas in mind, let us consider how Baum's
partial typology of motivations might relate to the court
practices explored in Part 11.104 For economy's sake, I deal
most extensively with the first goal on Baum's list and give
more limited attention to the subsequent issues,
recognizing that each set of goals could be the subject of a
stand-alone analysis.
A. Content of Legal Policy: The Transactional Model of
Chapter 11
The first item on Baum's list, content of legal policy,
includes a variety of related sub-goals, such as accurate
interpretation of existing law, clear and consistent
interpretation, and the judge's own policy preferences. 105 In
103. BAUM, supra note 102, at 17 tbl.1.1. Baum does not contend these goals
share equal priority, are ranked in a strict hierarchy, or are even operative in
any given situation. See id. at 24 (from research on state trial court sentencing
activity, observing that judges differ in their hierarchies of operative goals and
incentives); id. at 28 (research on mid-level courts recognizing that judges act
on multiplicity of goals, unlike most of research on Supreme Court justices that
proceeds from different assumptions); id. at 85 (reporting on studies).
104. See supra Part II.
105. See BAUM, supra note 102, at 17 tbl.1.1; KLEIN, supra note 96, at 7
(collecting studies finding that lower courts tend to act consistently with policies
announced by higher courts); id. at 13 (exploring claim that "judges act as they
do in part because they wish to make legally sound decisions, not simply that
considerations of legal correctness enter into their decisions."). Based on a
systematic case law analysis, Klein finds that U.S. Court of Appeals judges
prefer to adopt policies they happen to agree with, see id. at 81, but concludes
that consistency between courts of appeals decisions and Supreme Court
preference is "probably best explained by something other than the strategic
427
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this section, I consider the possibility that the changes and
trends in court practices discussed in Part II are consistent
with a particular world view of large-firm bankruptcy. The
essence of this view is that corporate reorganization is akin
to a transaction in which a court plays only a limited role. 106
A bankruptcy case, especially a large Chapter 11, is not
now, and never was, a typical case in the federal judicial
system. 107 Chapter 11 and its predecessors always have
straddled the worlds of judicial processes, administrative
processes, and negotiated business deals to some extent.10 8
In enacting Chapter 11 in 1978, Congress limited judges'
active oversight of cases and thus set Chapter 11 down the
path to an even less judicially-oriented process. 109 This
likely contributed to the development of court practices that
LoPucki characterizes as favorable to or lenient with case
placers.
One sees signs of Chapter l's transactional nature in
the 1980s, notwithstanding the prevailing conceptions of
pursuit of policy preferences," id. at 130, and "the goal of making legally sound
decisions offers the best explanation" of certain other findings. Id. at 141.
106. This is essentially an extension of Professor William Rubenstein's
transactional model of adjudication as originally applied to class actions. See
William B. Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of Adjudication, 89 GEO. L.J. 371
(2001). Rubenstein opined that class actions did not fit either an adjudicative or
managerial model of judging, leading him to posit a transactional model of
adjudication for such cases. The three main attributes of Rubenstein's model
are that litigation activities functionally amount to the structuring of a large
financial transaction ("to trade, not to try"), that a lawyer's work is as a
dealmaker rather than as a trial attorney, and that the adjudicative markers
are of secondary import in the development of the facts and the resolution. See
id. at 419-24.
107. See, e.g., James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and
the Judicial Power of the United States, 118 HARv. L. REV. 643, 719 (2004)
(discussing role of bankruptcy "commissioners"); Thomas E. Plank, Why
Bankruptcy Judges Need Not and Should Not Be Article III Judges, 72 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 567, 573 (1998) ("The original adjudication of bankruptcy matters
by bankruptcy commissioners was not considered a 'case' in law or equity."). See
generally Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Control Rights, Priority
Rights, and the Conceptual Foundations of Corporate Reorganizations, 87 VA. L.
REV. 921, 926-30 (2001) (discussing railroad equity receiverships).
108. See generally Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 107.
109. See LoPucki, supra note 19, at 746 ("One of the key concepts behind
Chapter 11 was to remove bankruptcy judges from the administration of
bankruptcy cases and permit them to act solely in a judicial capacity."). See
generally Kuney, supra note 69, at 34-39; Miller, supra note 18, at 2006, 2009.
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that decade of bankruptcy. During the 1980s, many
perceived the bankruptcy system as overly debtor-friendly
and cumbersome, evidenced in part by the fact that courts
allowed debtors an extended period during which they had
the exclusive right to file a plan.110 In addition, courts,
professionals, and parties were learning the 1978
Bankruptcy Code and resolving open issues through
litigation, which may have added to a conception of a
judicially-oriented system.' LoPucki and Whitford's
earlier research suggests, however, that characterizations
of bankruptcy as debtor-friendly and cumbersome were
overstated. For example, they found that creditors formally
initiated a higher percentage of large Chapter 11 cases than
of bankruptcy cases overall, suggesting that creditors saw
control opportunities and value in Chapter 11.112 And, even
in the 1980s, courts preferred negotiated resolutions to
adjudicated resolutions. 113 LoPucki and Whitford found
110. LoPucki and Whitford documented that the majority of debtors in large
Chapter 11 cases in the 1980s retained the exclusive right to file a plan
throughout their cases. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 71, at 693, 716
n.175. The perception developed that courts allowed debtors to linger in
Chapter 11, perhaps hoping to use the time to hoard cash, wait for a market
recovery, or simply to wield leverage over creditors whose interests were more
adversely affected by the wait. See LoPucki, supra note 19, at 731 (arguing
major problems in Chapter 11 stem from courts permitting cases to run
excessively long). See generally William C. Whitford, What's Right About
Chapter 11, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1379, 1381-82 (1994) (commentators thought
Chapter 11 was a disaster in the 1980s but data suggest that "many of these
deficiencies are not as serious as once supposed."); id. at 1383 (questioning
assumption of rampant self-interested management activity).
111. LoPucki and Whitford have observed that corporate reorganization
practice was evolving and dynamic, and hypothesized "this evolution reflects a
process of experimentation and learning on [the] part of lawyers, judges, and
the participants in the cases." See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 71, at 723
n.186.
112. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 71, at 756 n.277. In large cases,
creditors initiated six of forty-three cases, or 14%, as compared to less than one
half of one percent overall. Id.
113. See LoPucki, supra note 19, at 755. Firms in the 1980s also had
considerable management turnover and relatively few "management 'grabs."'
Whitford, supra note 110, at 1383 (reporting on empirical evidence in 1980s on
management turnover, and management compensation). See generally LoPucki
& Whitford, supra note 71, at 713 ("[C]reditors often exert considerable control
over a reorganizing company."); id. at 715, n.171 ("[Ilt is beyond dispute that
creditors frequently are consulted about management turnover decisions, and
boards of directors are frequently careful to hire someone that potential future
lenders will find acceptable."); id. at 739-40 (finding management "grabs" in a
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that, beyond granting extensions of the debtor's exclusive
period, judges rarely played a significant role: "Judicial
restraint seems to be a norm in large reorganization cases.
The implicit understanding is that the appropriate judicial
role involves deciding issues brought before the court by
parties in interest."114 In addition, sales of assets in
bankruptcy may have been more common in large cases in
the 1980s than is recalled by some commentators. 11 5
By the late 1990s, the prevailing conception of Chapter
11 and the role of the judge had evolved further to a
transactional model in the largest cases. A broader range of
Chapter 11 commentators perceived Chapter 11 as being
used to implement prearranged restructurings-negotiated
and resolved before the debtor was even under the
protection of the bankruptcy court-and to implement sales
in the absence of any expectation of a standalone corporate
reorganization. 1 16 Chapter 11 not only presented a forum
for negotiations among the existing players, but presented a
market opportunity for others." 7 Critics of Chapter 11 no
very small number of cases); id. at 750 (finding managers have "fragile tenure"
in large publicly held companies in Chapter 11).
114. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 71, at 717, 719.
115. See Whitford, supra note 110, at 1392; LoPucki & Whitford, supra note
71, at 747 (finding extensive liquidation of assets in 30 of 43 cases, although
some liquidations were contemplated in and took place after plan confirmation).
116. See Baird & Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, supra note 85, at 675-
76 (using LoPucki's database, finding fifty-two of ninety-three firms that
completed Chapter 11 in 2002 involved sales, and seven other cases were sales
in substance); id. at 678 (finding twenty-six cases "merely implemented a deal
that was already reached among the principal players at the time the petition
was filed."); id. at 679 ("Combined, sales and preexisting deals account for 84%
of the large Chapter 11s from 2002."); Baird, supra note 80, at 73 (eight of ten
largest Chapter 11 cases in 2002 used bankruptcy to sell assets either
piecemeal or going concern). See generally Douglas Baird & Robert K.
Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 751 (2002).
117. According to Professor David Skeel,
The endless negotiations and mind-numbingly bureaucratic
process that seemed to characterize bankruptcy in the 1980s have
been replaced by transactions that look more like the market for
corporate control. Whereas the debtor and its managers seemed to
dominate bankruptcy only a few years ago, Chapter 11 now has a
distinctively creditor-oriented cast. Chapter 11 no longer functions
like an anti-takeover device for managers; it has become, instead,
the most important new frontier in the market for corporate
control, complete with asset sales and faster cases.
2006] FAST, CHEAP, CREDITOR-CONTROLLED 431
longer needed to argue forcefully for proposals to replace
Chapter 11 with a market oriented approach because the
existing bankruptcy structure was accommodating the
market. 118
Like other actors in the system, judges gradually and
inevitably formed perceptions throughout this period about
their role in large corporate reorganizations.
Characterizations of a judge's approach in large bankruptcy
case as too lenient (as LoPucki might express), or too
intrusive, depend in part on expectations and
characterizations of Chapter 11.119 Whereas LoPucki
believes courts adopted overly lenient practices to attract
large cases, others might see the trends in court practices
as a growing recognition of the transactional model. As
many as six of LoPucki's seven-item list of damaging
changes in court practices, from chapter 6 of Courting
Failure, arguably reflect a transactional view of large
Chapter 11 cases. 120 Limiting independent scrutiny of plan
feasibility in large cases is certainly consistent with the
transactional model, as expressed even by those who have
concerns about the recent direction of Chapter 11.121
The transactional model also is clearly reflected in the
"complex Chapter 11" designation among courts that
David A. Skeel, Jr., Creditors' Ball: The "New" New Corporate Governance in
Chapter 11, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 917, 918 (2003) [hereinafter Skeel, Creditors'
Ball]; see also Baird, supra note 80, at 99 (discussing ways in which large
Chapter 1is are subsumed into corporate law); Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 28,
at 9 (observing that venue choices seemed more creditor-driven than debtor-
driven). Elsewhere, Skeel characterizes the rise of the use of debtor-in-
possession financing as corporate control as a return to railroad equity
receiverships. See David A. Skeel, Jr., The Past, Present, and Future of Debtor-
In-Possession Financing, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1905, 1905 (2004).
118. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Edward R. Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision
Making, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 356, 357 (2001); Skeel, Creditors'Ball, supra note
117, at 918 (explaining why complaints about Chapter 11 have subsided due to
changes in Chapter 11).
119. See, e.g., Melissa B. Jacoby, Prepacks and the Deal-Litigation Tension,
AM. BANKR. INST. J., March 2004, at 34-35. These factors, of course, are in
addition to the many non-bankruptcy-specific views of the role of judges in
lawmaking.
120. See supra Part II. The exception is critical vendor orders.
121. See, e.g., Miller & Waisman, supra note 87.
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adopted new procedures in the early 2000s. 122 Contrary to
expectations that might arise due to the use of the word
"complex," the complex case designation produces a more
expedited process and fewer procedural hurdles. 123
For those who embrace the transactional model, courts
that limit their involvement to overseeing sales and
approving parties' prearranged deals are fulfilling their
objectives. 124  Judges labeled as "competent"'125  and
"sophisticated"' 26 in this model are those who make
themselves accessible for quick decision-making and
approval of consensual deals but otherwise leave the parties
122. In future research on judicial behavior in bankruptcy, it may be
important to distinguish between the practices and decisionmaking of
individual bankruptcy judges and those of a court as an institution. For
purposes of this small portion of this review, however, I do not separately
develop these points.
123. Consider the general order of the United States Bankruptcy Court for
the Southern District of Texas, containing protocols for cases with a complex
Chapter 11 designation. See Bankruptcy Court General Order 2000-2 (Bankr.
S.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2000). The order defines a complex case functionally, as a
case that:
requires special scheduling and other procedures because of a
combination of one or more of the following factors: (a) The need for
"first day" emergency hearings for consideration of the use of cash
collateral, debtor-in-possession financing, and other matters vital to the
survival of the business; (b) The size of the case (usually total debt of
more than $5 million or more than $2 million in unsecured non-priority
debt); (c) The large number of parties in interest in the case; (d) The fact
that claims against the debtor and/or equity interests in the debtor are
publicly traded (with some creditors possibly being represented by
indenture trustees); (e) The need for simplification of noticing and
hearing procedures to reduce delays and expense; or (f) Other similar
factors.
Id. at 1 (emphasis added). A judge presiding over a complex Chapter 11 case
must arrange her schedule such that she can accommodate emergency "first
day" hearings not more than two business days after the hearing request. Id.
124. Baird and Rasmussen have observed that "[bjankruptcy judges no
longer pretend to possess the wisdom to chart the destiny of great corporations,"
Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Four (or Five) Easy Lessons From
Enron, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1787, 1811 (2002), and that "[m]odern bankruptcy
judges oversee auctions of going concerns and implement prenegotiated plans of
reorganization .... Baird & Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, supra note
85, at 699.
125. See, e.g., Ray et al., supra note 26.
126. See Skeel, supra note 26, at 328 (referring to the sophistication of
Delaware judges).
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alone to do their business in the largest cases. This is to be
contrasted with the more managerial role many judges
have adopted with respect to very small business cases. 127 I
respectfully disagree with LoPucki that additions to § 105
of the Bankruptcy Code can be characterized as a
command, or even an invitation, to judges to become
extensively involved in large Chapter 11 cases. 128
The adherence to policy positions may connect to other
goals and motivations, of course. Thus, the next several
sub-parts briefly connect the other items on Baum's
typology with the judicial behavior issues raised by
Courting Failure.
B. Relevant Court Audiences
Baum's second set of goals relates to personal standing
with court audiences. 129 In other work, Baum offers an
explanation that should resonate with those familiar with
the bankruptcy court:
Direct influence over a court also is facilitated by concentration
of business. A group whose members come before a court
frequently obtains a relatively good opportunity to shape judges'
perceptions and values. Continual interaction between regulatory
officials and their clienteles helps to produce agency sympathy
toward the problems and needs of the clientele groups. A similar
process seems to occur in some courts whose judges deal
continually with certain litigant groups, such as the criminal trial
court and the small claims court. 130
127. For a general characterization of the managerial model, see Judith
Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARv. L. REV. 374 (1982). For how judges in the
Northern District of Illinois handle small business cases, see generally Baird &
Morrison, supra note 118, at 356. One can interpret recent amendments to the
Bankruptcy Code as endorsing a distinction between the oversight of small
business and large business cases, with small business cases being kept under
more stringent managerial control. See BAPCPA, supra note 74.
128. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Where Do You Get Off?: A Response to Courting
Failure's Critics, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 511, 531-32 (2006).
129. See BAUM, supra note 102, at 17 tbl.1.1.
130. Baum, Judicial Specialization, supra note 101, at 827-28 (internal
citations omitted); see also BAUM, supra note 102, at 7 (referring to workgroups
or courthouse communities for trial judges); Baum, supra note 95, at "751;
Burbank & Friedman, supra note 89, at 29 (noting that "[1]ittle research exists.
• . on the question of how much lawyers or parties affect judicial independence"
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In addition to some convergence between judges' views
and repeat players, judges, being human, understandably
want to be well-regarded by these audiences. 131
If a relevant court audience suggests to judges that they
consider adjustments to their practices that allegedly have
worked well in other courts, we cannot be surprised when
courts take such requests seriously. Indeed, we might be
suspicious of a judge who rebuffs seemingly constructive
suggestions for improvement of the court. 132 Relevant court
audiences' general desire for speed also may contribute tojudges' receptiveness to practice changes that expedite
cases or to judges' incentives to approve party requests
quickly. 133
C. Career
Baum's third set of goals relate to a judge's career,
including continued tenure in a judicial position and
securing an attractive nonjudicial position.134  Baum
recognizes that the duration of a court appointment
as compared to the developed concept of capture in administrative law
literature, but that "[s]ome sorts of litigation draw lawyers as repeat players,
and courts of limited jurisdiction are particularly likely to see the same lawyers
over and over."); Kevin T. McGuire, Repeat Players in the Supreme Court: The
Role of Experienced Lawyers in Litigation Success, 57 J. POL. 187 (1995); Donald
R. Songer et al., Do the "Haves" Come Out Ahead Over Time? Applying
Galanter's Framework to Decisions of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 1925-1988, 33
LAw & SOC'Y REV. 811 (1999) ("[F]indings suggest that repeat player litigants
with substantial organizational strength ('haves') are much more likely to win
in the federal courts of appeals than one-shot litigants with fewer resources.
The 'haves' win more frequently in published decisions, even after controls are
introduced for the ideological makeup of the panel. The advantage in appellate
litigation enjoyed by repeat player 'haves' is remarkably consistent over time.").
131. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 28, at 1887 (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 190 (1999)); Richard A. Posner,
What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everyone Else Does),
3 SuP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 14 (1993) (discussing the popularity of judges among
lawyers as part of judicial utility).
132. Whether the suggested changes turned out to be constructive is an
issue raised but not resolved by Courting Failure. The relevant inquiry for this
analysis relates to the time the changes were proposed.
133. Cf. KLEIN, supra note 96, at 25-26 (reporting on judge interviews
regarding importance of producing decisions quickly).
134. See BAUM, supra note 102, at 17 tbl.1.1.
2006] FAST, CHEAP, CREDITOR- CONTROLLED 435
inevitably affects how a judge fulfills her obligations. 135
This is a highly relevant consideration to the bankruptcy
judiciary.
Bankruptcy judges are judicial officers of the United
States district court and lack life tenure. 136 Although
reappointment to a second fourteen-year term has been
granted to most who seek it, this portion of the court system
is just over twenty years old and the process of
reappointment is uncertain. There currently is no
presumption of reappointment and much of the process is
determined by United States Judicial Conference
regulations and the evolving procedures of each circuit.
One would expect that the lack of life tenure would
affect court practices. Indeed, it seems central to arguments
that judges compete for cases. 137 For instance, lack of life
135. See id. at 17 ("If a four-year term is converted into a life term, the
judge's decisions might no longer reflect public opinion. If the judge perceives a
good opportunity to achieve a higher-paying position in corporate law, the
judge's decisions might now be aimed at pleasing the business community
rather than the general public. In such circumstances, analysis that focused
only on the interest in community approval would be incomplete."); id. at 145
(noting that scholars with economic and psychological perspectives agree that
details of court appointments may have impact on judges' choices).
136. See 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1) (2000); S. Elizabeth Gibson, Jury Trials in
Bankruptcy: Obeying the Commands of Article III and the Seventh Amendment,
72 MINN. L. REV. 967, 1054 (1988). See generally Judith Resnik, "Uncle Sam
Modernizes His Justice" Inventing the Federal District Courts of the Twentieth
Century for the District of Columbia and the Nation, 90 GEO. L.J. 607, 670, 675
(2002).
137. LoPucki is well aware of the possibility that job security may affect
judicial behavior and receptiveness to court audiences. See LoPucki & Whitford,
supra note 17, at 38 (explaining that local lawyers "may have occasion to
evaluate them in connection with their reappointment for an additional term,
newspaper or television stories about the quality of the judiciary, professional
honors and awards, or employment after they leave the bench."). Yet, when a
member of Congress asked LoPucki if he supported giving life tenure for
bankruptcy judges as a solution to the problems he identified, LoPucki did not
strongly advocate for it. See Administration of Large Business Bankruptcy
Reorganizations: Has Competition for Big Cases Corrupted the Bankruptcy
System? Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law,
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 92 (2004), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/printers/108th/ 94939.pdf (verbal response
of Lynn LoPucki) ("Life-time tenure would probably be a positive change. But at
this stage of this competition, I think it's too late for that to solve the problem.
We have the court in Delaware, which has created a large industry, many
people have moved to Delaware in reliance upon this industry being there.").
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tenure may increase judicial receptiveness to the views of
an important court audience that could affect
reappointment and future employment prospects.138
Judging by the literature on corporate law and the
Delaware chancery court, receptiveness and adaptation
help justify the decision to refrain from giving judges life
tenure. 139
Even if judges do not wish to be reappointed to the
bench, many desire other employment because they are not
ready to retire. Whether due to the desire for new
challenges, higher monetary compensation, or other factors,
some judges who might easily have been reappointed have
gone onto lucrative careers in private practice at prestigious
law firms. Commentators sometimes worry that even life
tenured judges are affected in their decision-making by
prospects of future employment. 140
D. Life on the Court and Standard of Living
The last two sets of goals on Baum's partial typology
relate to life on the court, including good relations with
other judges, power within the court, limited workloads,
court resources, personal income, and personal comfort.' 4 '
138. See, e.g., Burbank & Friedman, supra note 89, at 26 ("Once on the
bench, judges are more likely to respond to the influences that determine if they
keep their jobs tomorrow than to those responsible for giving them the job
yesterday."); Resnik, supra note 135, at 676-77 (discussing the role of
"[slophisticated repeat-player litigants," and noting that "[als constitutional
judges evaluate the track records of statutory judges by soliciting information
from litigants and by reviewing decisions and reversal rates, they may prompt
lower level judges to search for supporters, publish little, and keep low
profiles.").
139. Professor Roberta Romano explains that the twelve-year term of the
Delaware Chancery Court judge "helps to ensure that members of the chancery
court will be sensitive to the state's policy of responsiveness in corporate law,
since judges who ignore the political consensus in the state will not be
reappointed." ROMANO, supra note 32, at 40; id. at 123 ("life tenure diminishes
the judge's incentive, provided by the need for reappointment, to be responsive
to changing business conditions."). Professor Jill Fisch has described the
Delaware Chancery Court as having unusual features and processes that make
it function somewhat more like a flexible legislature and less like a traditional
court. See generally Fisch, supra note 33.
140. See, e.g., EMILY FIELD VAN TASSEL, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., WHY JUDGES
RESIGN: INFLUENCES ON FEDERAL JUDICIAL SERVICE, 1789 to 1992, 16 (1993).
141. See BAUM, supra note 102, at 17 tbl.1.1.
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When repeat player lawyers repeatedly praise a magnet
court's handling of cases, some judges understandably will
want to learn about the methods of their colleagues and
consider integrating them into their own courts if
appropriate. 142 Even if judges have relatively strong notions
of how to do their jobs, many are open to learning from each
other. 143
Judges also may have implicit workload management
reasons to adopt the practices LoPucki highlighted in
chapters 5 and 6 of Courting Failure. The practices tend to
require immediate judicial responsiveness. Yet, they do not
necessarily require heavy independent evaluation of many
issues as long as a sufficient number of parties in interest
are actively participating and no one objects. The practices
also tend to expedite cases and give discretion to the parties
to manage their own affairs.144
What should we take away from this analysis overall? A
constellation of factors likely shapes the large-case practices
of bankruptcy judges individually, and courts more
collectively. At this juncture, we cannot simply assume that
a venue restriction will alter the handling of large cases in
some fundamental-and fundamentally positive-way.
Even if some judges want to preside over large cases, this
desire likely has a complex interaction with other goals in
shaping their behavior.
CONCLUSION
For over twenty years, Professor Lynn LoPucki's
empirical and theoretical contributions have informed and
shaped academic and professional discussions of the
bankruptcy system. Without LoPucki's work, many of our
assumptions about large corporate reorganizations would
be constructed through anecdote. Courting Failure is a
capstone contribution that brings much of LoPucki's in-
142. See, e.g., Skeel, supra note 20, at 1278 (noting that "Delaware's success
in the 1990s might have prompted other districts to improve their case
administration .... ").
143. See, e.g., Stripp, supra note 91, at 1334-35.
144. Cf. Burbank & Friedman, supra note 89, at 28; Posner, supra note 131,
at 20; Stripp, supra note 91. For example, scholars consider the impact of
managing large workloads on the use of law clerks and the drafting of decisions.
See, e.g., BAUM, supra note 102, at 45; Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 102.
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depth academic work into a new framework, into the public
discourse, and into Congressional debates.
The central objections of this Review have stemmed
from the fact that Courting Failure's theories and
assumptions go considerably farther than the data or the
available literature can support. The existing evidence of
changes to court practices neither match up with the trends
in the repeat filing rates, nor bear an obvious relationship
to post-confirmation failure in many instances. In addition,
judges surely respond to a wide range of incentives and
goals in formulating their case management plans; the idea
that judges would substantially change their case
management plans in response to a venue restriction is not
well supported, at least not right now.
Would-be readers should not make the mistake of
concluding that the book's limitations are a license to ignore
it. The book sounds a credible warning that all is not well in
our current Chapter 11 system and implicitly presents a
host of research questions for LoPucki and other scholars. 145
LoPucki may have hoped that Courting Failure contained
the answer to a pressing question, but he has done
something more important than resolve an old debate. He
has initiated many new ones.
145. For example, it would be useful to look more closely at patterns of and
trends in court practices in the 1990s, including, but not limited to, the very
largest cases in LoPucki's dataset. LoPucki starts this project in chapter 6 of
Courting Failure but does not finish it. In addition, LoPucki's assertions about
the role of court practices suggest that it would be useful to enlist judicial
politics and behavior scholars, from political science, economics, and psychology,
to study the bankruptcy court.
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